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Jonas Wolff, Hans-Joachim Spanger, Cemal Karakas  
Abstract 
Academic interest in democracy promotion notwithstanding, there is still little research that 
systematically compares different democracy promoters with a view to identifying the factors that 
explain variance in democracy promotion policies. The paper presents results of a research project 
that set out to contribute to filling this gap by analyzing the democracy promotion policies of two 
“donors” (USA, Germany) towards six “recipient” countries (Pakistan and Turkey, Bolivia and 
Ecuador, Russia and Belarus). It studies how “donor” states react to specific challenges that arise 
from “recipient” countries and that lead to conflicting objectives on the part of the democracy 
promoters. The paper asks how democracy promoters, across the twelve cases, deal with 
conflicting objectives and assesses the overall national patterns that characterize U.S. and German 
democracy promotion. With a view to both tasks, the paper offers causal explanations that are 
based on a theoretical framework that combines power-, interest- and norm-based determinants. 
While the mainstream view argues that “hard” interests regularly prevail over “soft” norms in cases 
of conflict, the analysis shows that the causal effect of the individual determinants on democracy 
promotion is not uniform, but depends on both the configuration of determinants and on the 
specific conditions in the “recipient” country. 
1. Introduction1 
George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda has elevated democracy promotion to an undisputedly im-
portant topic for the discipline of International Relations (IR) and beyond.2 There is a wide range of 
studies dealing with different questions related to the international promotion of democracy.3 Re-
search on the behavior of actors that are promoting democracy around the world has arrived at a 
diverse picture.4 Different democracy promoters prefer quite different strategies and instruments 
and pursue rather different goals. At the same time, the policies of one and the same democracy 
promoter may also vary greatly – depending, in particular, on the specific circumstances in the 
“recipient” countries. There is, however, still little research that would systematically analyze the 
                                                 
 
1 This working paper presents results from a four-year research project jointly conducted by PRIF and Goethe University 
Frankfurt which received generous funding from the German Research Foundation (DFG). Further members of the re-
search team included Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Aser Babajew and Iris Wurm. In the course of our work we have benefited from 
comments by many colleagues including Peter Burnell, Thomas Carothers, Jörg Faust, Tina Freyburg, Esther Skelley Jor-
dan, Milja Kurki, Wolfgang Merkel, Harald Müller, Marina Ottaway, Annika E. Poppe, Peter W. Schulze, Juliana Viggiano, 
and Laurence Whitehead. The authors also thank Vera Rogova, Daniel Schewe, Bentje Woitschach and Niels Graf for re-
search assistance. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 2012 Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association (ISA). The overall results of the project are published in Wolff et al. (2012, forthcoming). 
2  For a selection of articles on democracy promotion from major IR journals, see Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006); 
Finkel et al. (2007); Finlay (2007); Ish-Shalom (2006); Lo et al. (2008); Monten (2005); Scott and Steele (2011); Wolff 
and Wurm (2011). 
3  Scholars, for instance, have dealt with the specific democracy promotion policies employed by the US (cf. Azpuru et al. 
2008; Carothers 1991, 1999; Cox et al. 2000; Monten 2005, Peceny 1999; Robinson 1996; Smith 1994) and the EU (cf. 
Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Wetzel and Orbie 2011; Youngs 2010); tried to assess the im-
pact of democracy promotion in the ‘recipient’ countries (cf. Finkel et al. 2007; Scott and Steele 2011); and (critically) 
examined the ideological and/or conceptual underpinnings of democracy promotion (cf. Ish-Shalom 2007; Kurki and 
Hobson 2012; Smith 2007). 
4  See Burnell (2000); Carothers (2009); Herman and Piccone (2003); Kopstein (2006); Magen et al. (2009); Schraeder 
(2002, 2003); Youngs (2004). 
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policies employed by different democracy promoters in order to comparatively assess and theoreti-
cally explain the existing variance.5  
This paper presents results of a research project that casts a different look at democracy promotion 
by systematically comparing U.S. and German democracy promotion policies with a view to theo-
retically identifying the factors that shape democracy promotion (see Wolff et al. forthcoming). 
Empirically, the project analyzes U.S. and German policies towards six “recipient” countries: Paki-
stan and Turkey, Bolivia and Ecuador, Belarus and Russia. In each case, the focus is on particular 
instances in which political developments in the recipient countries led to conflicting objectives on 
the part of democracy promoters. As will be argued below, analyzing the ways in which democracy 
promoters handle conflicts of objectives is a particularly promising strategy in order to assess the 
motives and drivers behind democracy promotion. 
The paper starts by outlining the research design (2.). In the section on the theoretical framework 
(3.), five determinants are presented that are hypothesized to account for differences and common-
alities in democracy promotion policies and, in particular, in democracy promoters’ reactions to 
conflicting objectives: a power-based determinant (relative power position); two interest-based 
factors (security and economic interests); and two normative determinants (relating to national 
political culture and international norms).  
In Section 4, we look at the different kinds of reactions to conflicting objectives across the cases. As 
main finding, we identify a common causal dynamic that holds for both the U.S. and Germany and 
their patterns of reaction: While the mainstream view argues that “hard” interests regularly prevail 
over “soft” norms in cases of conflict, our analysis shows that the causal effect of the determinants 
listed above (whether power-, interest- or norm-based) on democracy promotion is not uniform, 
but depends on both the configuration of determinants and on the specific conditions in the recipi-
ent country. The result is what we call “alternatively conditioned double standards”.  
In Section 5, we focus on the national patterns that characterize U.S. and German democracy pro-
motion. We describe commonalities and differences between the two across the different dimen-
sions of democracy promotion (from electoral observation and foreign aid to the use of sanctions). 
The analysis shows that German democracy promotion – cooperative, politically cautious and 
long-term in orientation – can be heuristically grasped by the ideal-type conception of a “Civilian 
Power” (outlined in 3.1). U.S. democracy promotion, by contrast, only partially corresponds to the 
opposite ideal type – the assertive “Freedom Fighter” – and also encompasses Civilian Power-type 
activities. This difference between the coherent “Civilian Power” Germany and the much less con-
sistent pattern of the U.S. can be explained by different configurations of interests and norms, 
which in the German case are quite harmonious across the recipient countries but regularly collid-
ing in the case of the U.S. 
2. The Research Design 
According to official self-understanding, the foreign and development policies of “North-Western” 
democracies are invariably guided by “liberal” norms, i.e., by democracy, the rule of law, and hu-
man rights. At the same time, the promotion of democracy, at least since 1990, is commonly pre-
sented as serving all relevant “national interests”.6 As long as norms and interests do indeed coalesce 
in democratic foreign and development policy, it is hardly possible to identify the determinants of 
democracy promotion. For this reason, the case studies focus on those instances in which democ-
                                                 
 
5  Most existing comparative studies on democracy promoters are largely descriptive (cf. Burnell 2000; Youngs 2004; 
Herman and Piccone 2003). Comparative studies with more theoretical ambitions include the edited volumes by 
Magen et al. (2009) and Schraeder (2002); but, when it comes to explaining variance in democracy promotion policies, 
also these two books are not based on an explicit theoretical framework. Notable exceptions are two relative dated stud-
ies that focus entirely on the U.S. (Peceny 1999; Robinson 1996). 
6  This refers, in particular, to democracy’s instrumental value in terms of peace/security (as the Democratic Peace thesis 
has it; cf. Smith 2007) and in terms of development/poverty reduction (as the current mainstream view in development 
theory and policy argues; cf. Sen 1999). 
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racy promoters are confronted with conflicting objectives.7 Analytically, we distinguish between 
extrinsic conflicts – when the aim to promote democracy clashes with other donor interests – and 
intrinsic conflicts – when different sub-goals of democracy promotion such as stability and partici-
pation collide. The analysis and comparison of situations in which democracy promoters have to 
deal with competing objectives and make tough decisions promises powerful evidence as to the 
motives and factors that drive democracy promotion which allows to draw theoretical conclusions. 
The focus on democracy promotion by the U.S. and Germany deliberately implies a state-centered 
perspective. One reason is the observation that nation states are arguably still the most important 
type of actors in democracy promotion (cf. Magen and McFaul 2009: 2-4; Schraeder 2003: 34-40). 
The second reason is methodological: in order to contribute to theoretically guided causal research, 
it is reasonable to start with a comparative look at one type of democracy promoters only. Given the 
differences in “actorness” between states, international and non-governmental organizations, trying 
to identify the determinants of state, non-state and multilateral democracy promotion on the basis 
of one inclusive theoretical framework and one general design of structured, focused comparison 
does not promise sound results. 
Among states the U.S. is the most important actor in democracy promotion. As “the world’s most 
powerful democracy with unrivalled global reach and capabilities” (Herman and Piccone 2003: 
212), the U.S. has decisive influence on the overall discourse and practice of democracy promotion. 
Last not least, the U.S. is the world’s largest provider of democracy assistance (cf. Azpuru et al. 
2008). Germany was chosen as a second donor country to be compared to the U.S. because it ranks 
among the most important European donors in democracy assistance (Youngs 2008: 160-1). In 
addition, German foreign policy – including German democracy promotion – is often contrasted 
to the U.S. While the U.S. is regularly associated with strong security interests and an assertive, pro-
active or missionary style of promoting democracy, Germany is typically considered a “Civilian 
Power” whose foreign policy is characterized as multilateral and oriented towards international 
values and rights; as driven rather by economic than by security interests; and as much more cau-
tious and reluctant when it comes to meddling in the internal affairs of other states (cf. Schraeder 
2003: 33-38; Spanger and Wolff 2007: 280-4).8 
U.S. and German policies on six recipient countries are analyzed, grouped into three regional pairs: 
Pakistan and Turkey, Bolivia and Ecuador, Belarus and Russia. The three regions – the Greater 
Middle East, South America and the post-Soviet space – were chosen because they represent differ-
ent kinds of challenges to democracy promotion (see below). The individual countries were select-
ed because they share two central features: some basic form of democratic rule, at least temporari-
ly;9 and at the beginning, in the early 1990s, U.S. and German relations with none of the recipient 
countries were characterized by outright confrontation. These characteristics are important be-
cause, in order to trace reactions to emerging conflicts of objectives, the starting point for democra-
cy promoters had to be relatively benign. In all countries, however, political developments have 
turned out considerably more difficult and contradictory than expected (by most) in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War. In this sense, the six recipient countries, like many others, demonstrate 
the failure of the “Transition Paradigm” (Carothers 2002). In contrast to teleological conceptions of 
transition, these countries were confronted with instances of political change in which the dilem-
mas that are inherent to democratization arose in different forms and compositions.10 On the part 
                                                 
 
7  On conflicting objectives in democracy promotion, see also Leininger et al. (2012). 
8  Research usually compares U.S. and “European” or EU democracy promotion efforts (cf. Carothers 2009; Kopstein 
2006; Magen et al. 2009; Youngs 2004). This comparison is, however, problematic given the heterogeneity of “Europe” 
and the very peculiar “actorness” of the European Union. 
9  Each of the countries – at least temporarily – scored 7 on the Polity IV scale (cf. Marshall and Jaggers 2006). 
10  We broadly distinguish three dilemmas of democratization (Spanger and Wolff 2007: 266-270): (1) Democratic regimes – 
and, in particular, political regimes in a process of democratization – can be threatened by escalating conflicts destabilizing 
democratic institutions (“democracy” vs. “stability”). (2) Multiple and contradictious societal demands may render an ef-
fective and democratic governance impossible (“democracy vs. “governability”). (3) Democratic procedures can lead to 
majority decisions that threaten core (constitutional) principles of democracy (“democracy” vs. “majority”). 
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of the external actors, these episodes meant that democracy promotion was challenged by (combi-
nations of) serious conflicts of objectives. 
Pakistan and Turkey represent challenges to democracy promotion that are characteristic of the 
(broadly defined) Greater Middle East. The political rise of Islamic and Islamist movements “from 
below” challenges not only the political regimes in the region but also the interests of North-
Western states cooperating with these regimes. Pakistan and Turkey are the two states in the region 
with, at least temporarily, basic democratic structures since 1990. Furthermore, the two countries’ 
bilateral relations with the U.S. and Germany have been generally cooperative and friendly, while 
both have been “targets” of active efforts at promoting democracy. Since the 1990s, however, there 
has been growing concerns among democracy promoters about the increasing Islamization and the 
increasing public presence of Islamist movements in the two countries as well as about the rise to 
power of an Islamic Party in Turkey. 
South America’s political regimes have also been challenged “from below” since the turn of the centu-
ry, albeit in quite different ways: social movements opposed the alleged imperatives of neoliberal 
globalization and toppled a number of elected governments. As part of a regional “turn to the left”, 
this opposition included a general critique of capitalism, liberal democracy and of the countries’ ex-
ternal dependence (especially on the U.S.). Bolivia and Ecuador represent countries in which this 
criticism translated into government policy. This includes a fundamental transformation of the politi-
cal regimes in question, a departure from (neo-) liberal economics and an escalation of socio-political 
conflicts. These changes and conflicts have taken place within basically democratic settings, but nev-
ertheless seriously challenge the interests and values of the “North-Western” donor community. 
Belarus and Russia, finally, represent a political path that is characteristic for much of the post-
Soviet space. Following an initial period of democratization in the (early) 1990s, in many countries 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) presidents were elected who, on the basis of 
(initial) democratic legitimacy, turned to increasingly authoritarian rule. The result has been the 
emergence of “semi-authoritarian” regimes (Ottaway 2003) that range from “defective democracies” 
to outright autocratic rule (Merkel et al. 2006). Belarus and Russia represent those states in the 
region that after temporary transitions to democracy have turned into the opposite direction; Free-
dom House, for example, classifies both countries as “not free” (Freedom House 2012). 
In all three pairs of states democracy promoters have been confronted with significant conflicts of 
objectives that have both intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions. Across the recipient countries, “democ-
racy” – i.e., democratic (majority) decisions – brought about results that, from the donors’ point of 
view, challenged or, in extreme cases, directly threatened democracy (intrinsic conflict). At the 
same time, security and/or economic donor interests were adversely affected (extrinsic conflict). In 
the cases of Pakistan and Turkey, the common challenge to democracy promotion is constituted by 
the rise of Islamic and Islamist movements; this raises the question whether donors should tolerate 
or even support restrictions on democracy or even coups d’état in order to protect the secular state 
and societal pluralism (intrinsic) and secure cooperation with the “West” (extrinsic). In Bolivia and 
Ecuador, the election of “radical” governments force donors to decide whether to tolerate, in the 
name of democratic self-determination, a gradual departure from universally conceived standards 
of liberal democracy and market economy (intrinsic) as well as related threats to specific donor 
interests (extrinsic). In Belarus and Russia, finally, political developments have given rise to the 
question of how democracy promoters should deal with governments that used domestic societal 
support to revert to authoritarianism (intrinsic) when donors, at the same time, are interested in 
securing continued international cooperation (at least on the part of Russia, extrinsic).11 
The combination of two donor states and six recipient countries adds up to twelve cases which – 
based on in-depth case studies – have been compared following the method of structured, focused 
comparison (George and Bennett 2005: Chapter 3). The object of research – namely, democracy 
                                                 
 
11  The specific extrinsic and intrinsic conflicts of objectives as well as their interplay in the twelve cases are discussed in 
detail below (see 4.1). 
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promotion by states – is defined in a broad sense: democracy promotion includes all measures 
aiming, from the outside, at “establishing, strengthening, or defending democracy in a given coun-
try” (Azpuru et al 2008: 151). Accordingly, the instruments encompass the entire spectrum of for-
eign, security, economic and development policies (cf. Schraeder 2003: 26). Systematically, we dis-
tinguish five dimensions of democracy promotion that are characterized by different logics of in-
fluence. With a view to each dimension it is to be examined to what extent and in which ways polit-
ical measures aim at promoting democracy (Table 1).12 
Table 1: Dimensions of Democracy Promotion: The Analytical Framework 
Dimension Logic of influence Description 
International  
observation 
Transparency Observation of democratic processes by external actors (e.g., electoral 
observation) 
Foreign aid Aid (technical & 
financial) 
Foreign/development aid that explicitly aims at promoting democracy 
(democracy assistance) 
Diplomacy Appeal 
(normative) 
Public statements by external actors, intergovernmental political dia-
logues and bilateral documents that explicitly refer to democracy 
(promotion) 
International  
cooperation 
Incentives 
(material) 
Political, military, economic or development cooperation that is tied to 
democracy-related conditions (positive incentives) or limited by democ-
racy-related sanctions (negative incentives) 
Military  
intervention 
Coercion 
(physical) 
Use of physical (military) force explicitly aimed at promoting democracy 
Source: Compilation by the authors, drawing on Wolff et al. (forthcoming). 
The variety of potential instruments of democracy promotion implies an equally wide range of 
actors (cf. Burnell 2000; Schraeder 2002). Even democracy promotion directly implemented by the 
government involves different actors. First, there are the governmental institutions that primarily 
shape external relations – in our cases, the Foreign and Defense Ministries, the White House and 
the Chancellory as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Ger-
man Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung – BMZ). Second, with regard to German devel-
opment cooperation, the official “implementing agencies” have to be considered as well, in particu-
lar the German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit – 
GTZ), the German Development Service (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst – DED) and the KfW De-
velopment Bank.13 Third, there are quasi-governmental organizations that have traditionally played 
an important role in democracy promotion. In the German case, this refers to the political founda-
tions (Stiftungen).14 In the case of the U.S., the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is in-
cluded as are NED’s four core grantees: the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International 
                                                 
 
12  The analytical framework presented in Table 1 draws on the one proposed by Magen and McFaul (2009: 11-4). Where-
as, for example, Carothers (1999: 335) focuses on democracy assistance only, Magen and McFaul, by including “con-
trol” and “material incentives”, also take into account democracy promotion outside the field of development coopera-
tion (see also Whitehead 1996). At the same time, they differentiate, as we do, between “normative suasion” and “ca-
pacity-building”. 
13  In January 2011, GTZ, DED and Capacity Building International (InWent) were merged into the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). During the period under study, however, the different organizations were 
still acting as separate entities. 
14  These are Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), Friedrich-
Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit (FNS), Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) and Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS). The politi-
cal foundations represent respective parliamentary groups in the German Bundestag. Their international activities are 
funded by the federal government according to the weighted share of their parties in the last four parliamentary elec-
tions. Still, they have to present individual program and project proposals to the BMZ, which also have to be accepted 
by the Foreign Office.  
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Republican Institute (IRI), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the Solidari-
ty Center.15 
3. The Theoretical Framework 
Drawing on theories of international relations and foreign policy as well as on research on the 
Democratic Peace and democracy promotion, we identify five factors that are considered to shape 
democracy promotion policies: (1) the relative power position in the bilateral relationship between 
donor and recipient; (2) the security interests of the donor in a given recipient country; (3) its eco-
nomic interests; (4) the specific culturally embedded conception of democracy promotion charac-
terizing the foreign policy of a given donor; (5) international norms, i.e., the institutionalization of 
norms related to democracy (promotion) in common international organizations.16 In this section, 
the five determinants are briefly described (3.1) followed by a comparative assessment are present-
ed (3.2). 
3.1 Factors Shaping Democracy Promotion Policies 
(1) Realist approaches in International Relations and utilitarian perspectives on the Democratic 
Peace refer to the relative power position as an important factor shaping democracy promotion in 
foreign policy (cf. Monten 2005: 118). Only in cases of pronounced asymmetries in relative power 
between donor and recipient country, promoting democracy from the outside is rational in the 
sense of promising tangible effects at appropriate costs and of controlling the risks of democratiza-
tion. Conversely, balanced power relations or an asymmetry in favor of the recipient should lead to 
restraint on the part of the donor. The relative power position between donor and recipient is 
measured by drawing on two quantitative indicators: the Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC) compiled by the Correlates of War Project and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).17 
(2) From a modified (Neo-) Realist perspective, security interests can drive democracy promotion if 
the democratic character of other states’ political regime is seen by the donor government as con-
tributing to international peace and national security. In such a “security-based approach” (Peceny 
1999: 3) promoting democracy becomes an instrument of security policy (cf. Smith 1994). The 
positive impact of democratization on national security, however, is only long-term. In the short 
run, there can be conflicts and then immediate security concerns will prevail over democracy pro-
motion once both clash (Carothers 1999: 16). Democracy promotion, here, depends largely on the 
relevance of the particular recipient country for the security interests of the donor. To measure 
security interests, three indicators were chosen: a qualitative assessment of the security cooperation 
between donor and recipient; the possession of nuclear weapons by recipient country (yes/no); and 
an assessment of the strategic location of the recipient from the perspective of the donor. 
(3) Economic interests are equally often referred to in the literature. According to Economic Liberal-
ism in IR (Moravcsik 1997: 528-9), democratic regimes promise conditions (predictability, stability, 
rule of law) that are crucial for economic cooperation. In addition, Democratic Peace research 
emphasizes that democracies are particularly prone to increase political cooperation and economic 
                                                 
 
15  The NED, founded in 1983, is a nongovernmental organization, but its budget is annually fixed by Congress. NED’s 
Board of Directors is composed of representatives from the Republican and the Democratic Party, the US chamber of 
commerce and the labor unions. These institutions are also the main beneficiaries of NED grants. In addition to these 
core grantees, NED gives grants to civil society organizations in recipient countries. While critical observers regard the 
NED and its sub-institutes as instruments of the U.S. government (Robinson 1996: 71-116), Carothers (1991: 232-3) 
emphasizes that Congress exerts a more direct influence by controlling NED’s funding whereas the approval of NED 
projects by the State Department is “in practice a pro forma requirement” (Carothers 1991: 232-3). 
16  The literature review identified an additional factor that might shape democracy promotion policies: domestic special 
interests, along the lines of “republican” Liberalism (Moravcsik 1997: 530). This factor is not included here as part of 
the theoretical framework because its impact on democracy promotion is idiosyncratic and therefore can hardly be 
specified on this comparative level. For a comprehensive discussion of competing theoretical perspectives on democra-
cy promotion, see Wolff and Wurm (2011). 
17  A comprehensive presentation of the data including sources can be found in Wolff et al. (forthcoming) or requested 
from the authors. 
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interdependence with each other (Ikenberry 1999; Mansfield et al. 2002). Democracy promotion, 
from this perspective, directly serves economic interests – but democracy, again, is promoted for its 
instrumental long-term value only and democracy promotion should, therefore, take a back seat 
when colliding with tangible economic interests of the donor. Two indicators measure economic 
interests: the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the respective recipient country and 
the amount of bilateral trade, both measured as a share of total donor FDI/trade. 
(4) From the perspective of an actor-centered Constructivist approach to IR (Harnisch 2003: 340), 
scholars have emphasized national role conceptions (Holsti 1970), national identities (Katzenstein 
1996), or political cultures (Duffield 1999) as important factors shaping foreign policy and, thereby, 
democracy promotion.18 These culturally rooted national self-perceptions, roles or identities are 
seen to shape how states form and change national preferences; how policy-makers perceive and 
interpret the world outside; and how they translate such preferences and perceptions into foreign 
policy decisions (Wolff and Wurm 2011: 84). The ways in which a government promotes democra-
cy, conceptualizes democratization processes and defines its appropriate role as an external actor is, 
then, shaped by the historical experiences of a specific country and its more general (foreign) polit-
ical culture. This factor – national conceptions of democracy promotion – is different from the other 
four in that it does not vary in accordance with different recipient countries. In order to measure 
the conceptual differences, a qualitative content analysis was conducted that investigated the overall 
outline of democracy promotion in official government documents from the two countries.19 Based 
on this analysis, German official rhetoric is found to generally correspond to a “Civilian Power” 
conception of democracy promotion while the U.S. approaches an ideal-type conception we call 
“Freedom Fighter”.20 This, however, does not imply that German and U.S. democracy promotion 
policies in individual cases necessarily correspond to these overall conceptions that have been de-
tected in non-recipient-specific donor documents. Whether such a correspondence exists – and, 
thus, general patterns distinguishing German from U.S. democracy promotion – is precisely one of 
the empirical questions for the comparative analysis. 
The two ideal types are defined by differences across four dimensions: 
(a) The Freedom Fighter is characterized by an explicit and narrow focus on liberal democracy, 
emphasizing civil liberties and political rights. The Civilian Power is guided by rather abstract 
and broad values, emphasizing international human rights in general.  
(b) The mode of democratization is conceived of either as a fairly short-term, quasi-revolutionary 
process of regime change (Freedom Fighter) or as a long-term, evolutionary process of transfor-
mation involving a series of gradual steps (Civilian Power).  
(c) Concerning the attitude towards actors that are perceived as opponents to democracy or 
non-democrats, the Freedom Fighter, bound to a Manichean worldview, privileges strategies of 
exclusion and confrontation towards the “enemies” of democracy. The Civilian Power, con-
cerned with inducing gradual change through engagement, prefers pragmatic strategies of (in-
stitutional) cooperation and inclusion.  
(d) The Freedom Fighter’s style of democracy promotion is proactive; assertive action on the 
part of external actors is legitimate and, at times, needed in order to enforce democratic stan-
dards. The Civilian Power, in contrast, is relatively reluctant to openly meddle in other states’ af-
fairs and to infringe on their rights to sovereignty and collective self-determination. 
                                                 
 
18  The same argument is made by normative approaches to the Democratic Peace, which explain the specific peace-
proneness of democratic states (at least, vis-à-vis fellow democracies) as a result of their externalizing domestically em-
bedded liberal-democratic norms (Risse-Kappen 1995). 
19  This content analysis drew on 20 primary sources for each government. Both subsamples included the most important 
official strategy papers and speeches that explicitly deal with democracy promotion as well as primary sources that out-
line the general guidelines of foreign, defence and development policy. The analysis is presented in Poppe et al. (forth-
coming). 
20  The term Civilian Power was introduced by Hanns Maull (cf. Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 2001). 
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(5) While actor-centered Constructivism emphasizes the domestic socio-cultural context of foreign 
policy, Constructivist approaches in IR also refer to the impact of “international cultural environ-
ments” on foreign policy (Jepperson et al. 1996: 34). More specifically, international norms can be 
seen as defining shared expectations of appropriate behavior. In this sense, the extent to which 
democracy and democracy promotion are established as international norms directly impacts the 
foreign policy of states. Although such norms have been established at the global level of the United 
Nations, they are much stronger, more explicit and institutionalized at the level of some regional 
organizations (Piccone 2005). The strength of democracy-related international norms is assessed by, 
first, looking at the extent to which a group of states institutionalizes democracy as a common, 
binding principle: Is a democratic political regime a condition for membership, and do violations 
result in sanctions? Do regional organizations define the active promotion of democracy as a legit-
imate objective of the organization and/or the member states, and are there instruments to this 
effect? In order to measure the strength of such democracy-related international norms for a given 
pair of states, the joint international (regional) organization with the highest democracy standards 
for the dyad is consulted. 
3.2 The Configurational Perspective 
The theoretical framework presented above differentiates between power-, interest- and norm-
based factors. In addition to factor (1) which grasps a core feature of the bilateral relationship be-
tween donor and recipient, factors (2) and (3) correspond to the main foreign-policy interests (se-
curity, economic), while factors (4) and (5) refer to the two main normative frames (national, in-
ternational) that are expected to guide foreign policies. The mainstream view on democracy pro-
motion concurs with what Carothers (1999: 16) once called a “semi-realist approach to democracy 
promotion”: Democracy promotion, from this perspective, constitutes a relevant foreign-policy 
aim, “sometimes compatible with and sometimes contrary to economic or security interests”; but 
when it runs counter, “it is usually overridden” (Carothers 1999: 16). The observation that foreign-
policy interests ultimately dominate the “normative goal of democracy” (Schraeder 2003: 33) is, 
however, not sufficiently specified given that, in democracy promotion, “material” foreign-policy 
interests and “ideational” democratic values are generally considered to coalesce. When, for exam-
ple, U.S. democracy promotion is regarded as a “national grand strategy” (Doyle 2000: 21), it is not 
plausible to assume that it is easily overridden by other foreign-policy interests. And when democ-
racy promotion after the Cold War is not seen as a “purely soft, idealistic interest” any more, but no 
less as a “pragmatic interest that reinforces other interests” (Carothers 1999: 60), then it would be 
surprising if governments would always sacrifice “strategic objectives such as democracy promo-
tion” for immediate security or economic interests (McFaul 2005: 158). 
In order to understand the complex dynamics behind democracy promotion, it is therefore necessary 
to treat the above factors not as competing independent variables whose individual explanatory power 
is to be assessed, but as interrelated parts of “configurations of causally relevant conditions” (Ragin 
2007: 15).21 In this sense, Table 2 presents the configurations of factors across the twelve cases: 
  
                                                 
 
21  Such a configurational perspective on causality is also suggested by the “analytic eclecticism” proposed by Sil and 
Katzenstein (2010: 20), which pays “attention to the multiplicity, heterogeneity, and interaction of causal mechanisms 
and processes that generate phenomena of interest”: “An eclectic approach also assumes the existence of complex in-
teractions among the distribution of material capabilities (typically emphasized in realism), the gains pursued by inter-
ested individual and collective actors (typically emphasized by liberals), and the role of ideas, norms, and identities in 
framing actors‘ understanding of the world and of their roles within it (privileged by constructivists),” (Sil and 
Katzenstein 2010: 37). 
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Table 2: Configurations of Determinants in Comparison 
 
(1) Relative  
Power 
(2) Security 
Interests 
(3) Economic 
Interests 
(4) National 
Conceptions 
(5) International 
Norms 
USA/Pakistan 3 4 3 4 (FF) 1 
Germany/Pakistan 2 3 3 4 (CP) 1 
USA/Turkey 3 3 3 4 (FF) 2 
Germany/Turkey 2 3 4 4 (CP) 4 
USA/Bolivia 4 3 2 4 (FF) 3 
Germany/Bolivia 4 1 1 4 (CP) 1 
USA/Ecuador 4 3 3 4 (FF) 3 
USA/Belarus 4 1 1 4 (FF) 2 
Germany/Ecuador 3 1 2 4 (CP) 1 
Germany/Belarus 3 2 2 4 (CP) 2 
USA/Russia 2 4 3 4 (FF) 2 
Germany/Russia 1 4 4 4 (CP) 3 
Note: All factors but determinant (4) were measured by drawing on both statistical data and qualitative as-
sessments as briefly indicated in Section 3.1. All (sub-) indicators and determinants were ranked on an ordinal 
scale ranging from 1 (minimal) to 4 (maximum). For a comprehensive presentation of the data including 
sources, see Wolff et al. (forthcoming). Determinant (4) is a dichotomous variable that is either FF (Freedom 
Fighter) or CP (Civilian Power) (on our ordinal scale, this factor is categorized as “4” throughout, because 
actor-centered Constructivism would not expect idiosyncratic conceptions of democracy promotion to vary in 
accordance with different recipient countries). 
At one end of the spectrum are those dyads that are characterized by high power asymmetries, 
marginal donor interests and a low level of democracy-related international norms (Germany vis-à-
vis Bolivia and Ecuador; Germany and USA vis-à-vis Belarus). In these cases, democracy promo-
tion policies can be expected to be largely shaped by the political culture of the individual donor 
country, i.e., its specific conception of democracy promotion. Conflicting objectives should be 
mainly of an intrinsic nature – i.e., pitting sub-goals of democracy promotion against each other – 
and donors should deal with these conflicts following a logic of normative appropriateness that is 
defined by their ideological predispositions. 
At the other end of the spectrum are those dyads that are characterized by less pronounced power 
asymmetries and/or much more pronounced security and/or economic interests (USA and Germa-
ny vis-à-vis Pakistan, Turkey and Russia; USA vis-à-vis Bolivia and Ecuador). In these cases for-
eign-policy interests are expected to play a much larger role in donor policies. In the cases of U.S. 
policy towards Pakistan and Russia these are primarily security interests; and in the case of Turkey 
security interests are on par with economic interests. The same applies to German relations with 
Pakistan (equally on a lower level) and with Russia (on the highest level), whereas in German rela-
tions with Turkey economic interests are of greater importance than security interests. In these 
cases, significant extrinsic conflicts of objectives are to be expected and donors should adapt their 
(democracy promotion) policies in line with their national interests – at the expense of their nor-
mative preferences.  
Democracy-related international norms too vary across the dyads. In the case of Germany’s policy 
towards Turkey these are conceivably strongest, as the EU enlargement process entails democratic 
streamlining and should therefore prevent a purely interest-driven policy. Even if German interests 
would stand against promoting Turkish democracy, one can expect the international normative 
setting to push Germany towards a relative coherent stance on democracy promotion. The same 
holds for U.S. policy towards Bolivia and Ecuador because of the strong democracy norms institu-
tionalized by the Organization of American States (OAS). Here, strong donor interests (mainly 
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security-related) on the one hand, and political culture and international norms on the other could 
then lead to a potential competition between interests and norms. 
4. Dealing with Conflicting Objectives 
4.1 The Interplay of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Conflicts 
The conflict situations pose quite different challenges to democracy – and thus produce equally 
different conflicts of objectives with which Germany and the U.S. are confronted in their policies of 
democracy promotion. This applies to both the extrinsic and the intrinsic conflicts. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, we will first look at extrinsic conflicts to, then, describe their interplay with intrin-
sic conflicts. 
German policy towards Bolivia, Ecuador, Turkey and Belarus is hardly confronted with extrinsic 
conflicts of objectives. As far as Germany’s strategic interests are concerned, the governments led by 
Evo Morales in Bolivia (since 2006) and by Rafael Correa in Ecuador (since 2007) pose a classic 
low-intensity conflict: Germany’s respect for democratic self determination has been challenged by 
these countries’ turn against “neoliberalism” and towards Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, but the policy 
changes in these two Andean countries do not constitute serious threats for German “national 
interests”.22 With respect to Turkey, Germany certainly has vital economic and security interests, 
and the fact that the largest Turkish-speaking diaspora in the world lives in Germany gives the 
German policy on Turkey a distinct domestic blend. This, however, has not produced a serious 
extrinsic conflict of objectives: Even when Islamic parties – the Welfare Party (RP) in the mid-
1990s, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002 – rose to power, Germany generally 
saw a cooperative strategy of promoting and protecting democracy in Turkey as contributing to 
these German interests. In the case of Belarus, the autocratic regime established by President Alex-
ander Lukashenko after his first election in 1994 has not led to major extrinsic conflicts of objec-
tives, neither on the part of Germany nor on the part of the U.S. Only in the wake of the Caucasus 
war in 2008, the prospect of driving a wedge between Belarus and Russia – officially aligned in a 
union state – temporarily tempered the drive to confront Lukashenko with calls for democratiza-
tion. Yet, in general but particularly pronounced in the case of the U.S., democracy promotion 
(directed against the Lukashenko regime) was seen as serving “Western” interests in regional bal-
ancing (directed against Russia). 
The remainder of seven pairs displays serious extrinsic conflicts of objectives. In U.S. policies towards 
Bolivia, respecting self-determination has been compromised by drug-related security interests and 
strategic considerations: President Morales declared an end to the U.S.-driven “War on Drugs” and to 
“neoliberal” economics, joined the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Ameri-
ca (ALBA) and fiercely criticized the U.S. government to the point of expelling, in the course of 2008, 
the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The election of Correa in 
Ecuador led to similar developments, including the closure of the U.S. military base in Manta and 
threats to U.S. business interests in the oil sector; yet, Correa’s counternarcotics policies were judged 
by the U.S. as much more cooperative and successful than Morales’s. In the case of Turkey pro-
nounced U.S. security interests in a reliable NATO ally collide with respect for Turkish self-
determination insofar as both Islamic parties, previously the RP and currently the AKP, have chal-
lenged the basic secular and Kemalist, pro-Western orientation of the country. Furthermore demo-
cratic reforms of the AKP government have been aiming at reducing the political role and relevance of 
the Turkish military, the core addressee of U.S. security policy. In the case of Pakistan, it was the war 
in Afghanistan that has produced a serious conflict of objectives in that General Pervez Musharraf 
and his autocratic regime became a vitally important U.S. ally in the “War on Terror” (until Mushar-
raf ’s resignation in 2008). To some extent this also applied to Russia’s cooperation in the “War on 
                                                 
 
22  Only in one (minor) case, a Germany company and, thus, German business interests were affected by the new Bolivian 
policies of “nationalization”. 
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Terror”, on Afghanistan and Iran which had some mitigating effect on a democracy promotion aimed 
at the increasingly authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin. The German conflict of objectives vis-à-vis 
Pakistan in the wake of the Afghanistan campaign evolved in line with the U.S. In the case of Russia, 
however, the German interest in cooperation has been markedly higher than the U.S. interest, and it 
has been more economic than security-related. 
How did the two democracy promoters react when democracy in a recipient country challenged 
their donor interests? In principle, the case studies support the well-established finding that almost 
always foreign-policy interests prevail over democracy aims (cf. Carothers 1999: 16; Schraeder 
2003: 41). This could be clearly observed in U.S. policies towards Pakistan (after 9/11) and Turkey 
as well as in German and (albeit less pronounced) U.S. policies towards Russia. Belarus also sup-
ports this finding as the virtual absence of U.S. or German “national interests” clearly facilitated the 
relatively consistent and increasingly coordinated (if largely ineffective) policy of combining dip-
lomatic pressure, public criticism and increasing sanctions against the Lukashenko regime. 
This, however, is only part of the story. The case studies also reveal the limits of such a “realist” 
foreign policy and, thus, of the explanatory power of materially defined “national interests”. In 
different ways, democracy invariably has been part of the overall picture. 
First, even when “material” interests were arguably privileged over democracy promotion, donors 
still felt obliged to justify their policies as normatively appropriate.23 The German government, for 
example, pointed to the burden of history, the (still early) stage of democratic development and to 
difficult socioeconomic conditions in Russia in order to qualify existing “deficits”. In a similar way, 
U.S. and German support for Musharraf was in part explained by the need to stabilize the country 
and make it fit for democracy (given both the turbulent history of fragile democratic governments 
and the current terrorist/Islamist threat). With a view to Turkey, the U.S. justified its reluctance to 
explicitly support the AKP government against domestic threats from the old Kemalist elite by 
referring to the “secular democratic principles” guaranteed by the country’s constitution (which 
was, to be sure, once imposed by the military). Bolivia’s exclusion from U.S. Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) aid was technically based on a gradual decline in governance indicators. And the 
U.S. focus on fighting drug production and trafficking in the Andean region has always been justi-
fied as contributing as much to core U.S. interests as to the stability of the local democratic regimes. 
Second, the domestic politics of international democracy promotion prevented donor governments 
from entirely ignoring relevant calls from within society. For example, the relatively sympathetic 
attitude of the German government towards Russia regularly met with public criticism from oppo-
sition parties, NGOs and the media. Thus democracy and human rights remained on the bilateral 
agenda, even if on a rather low level and embedded in a not-too-political agenda of forging a 
“modernization partnership” between Germany and Russia. Also the close U.S. cooperation with 
Pakistan following 9/11 proved highly controversial in the U.S. and when, in 2007, tensions be-
tween Musharraf and the judiciary escalated it became increasingly difficult for the U.S. Admin-
istration to stick to its ally. 
Third, the U.S., let alone Germany, did not undertake visible efforts to enforce foreign-policy inter-
ests by openly acting against democracy in recipient countries – even vis-à-vis relatively powerless 
states. Some negative reactions notwithstanding, the Bush administration generally accepted the 
elected governments of Morales in Bolivia and Correa in Ecuador even as the two, and Morales in 
particular, acted in opposition to core U.S. interests. The U.S. – while sticking to its traditional 
Kemalist allies and the military in particular – also continued cooperating with the AKP govern-
ment and tried to maintain a rather neutral position vis-à-vis intra-Turkish conflict. Of course, U.S. 
reactions in these cases reflect not necessarily a genuine respect for democratic norms, but also a 
                                                 
 
23  As the following examples show, the need to justify policies as in accordance with (long-term) democracy aims leaves 
quite some leeway for interest-driven policies that, in effect, mean forgoing any active measures of democracy promo-
tion. Still, as will be argued below, this normative obligation does constrain democracy promoters from actively violat-
ing democratic norms by openly confronting an elected government – as demonstrated, most notably, in the case of US 
policies towards Bolivia. 
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pragmatic acceptance of the balance of power in the recipient countries. Yet, still, as further dis-
cussed in 4.2, there are strong indications that democratic legitimacy tends to protect governments 
that act against U.S. preferences from being confronted with corresponding U.S. countermeasures. 
Turning to intrinsic tensions in the democracy promotion agenda, the case studies not only show that 
the problem of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion consists of more than the well-known 
clash of “interests” and “norms”; they also demonstrate that – and how – the extrinsic conflicts are 
intertwined with intrinsic conflicts.24 On the one hand, the intrinsic conflicts enabled donors to de 
facto solve extrinsic conflicts in favor of pursuing national interests without explicitly breaking with 
the declared aim of democracy promotion: as each solution to an intrinsic conflict implies a certain 
norm violation with a view to some democracy-related sub-goals (in favor of other sub-goals), a rela-
tive broad range of reactions can be framed as normatively appropriate. On the other, however, intrin-
sically conflicting objectives posed real political challenges to be dealt with. 
Following his first election as president of Russia in 2000, Putin did not simply abolish Russian 
democracy but he assured political stability and state capacity following the chaotic and not-too-
democratic Yeltsin era. It was therefore difficult to assess whether the net impact on democracy was 
positive, neutral or negative, certainly during the first years of Putin’s presidency. In the case of 
Pakistan, there could be no doubt that the 1999 coup violated the most basic democratic rules, but 
the experience with Pakistan democracy in the 1990s and the difficult domestic and regional situa-
tion lent some plausibility to Musharraf ’s claim that a gradual path of managed modernization 
were the best strategy for long-term democratization. The implications of the governments of Mo-
rales (Bolivia), Correa (Ecuador) and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey) for democracy in respective 
countries are no less ambivalent, if with a clearly pro-democratic bend. All three represent im-
portant progress towards improving democracy while, at the same time, their political projects 
include elements that – from the perspective of the donors – pose threats to liberal democracy: the 
reliance on plebiscitarian support facilitating one-party dominance at the expense of liberal princi-
ples of checks and balances; or the promulgation of indigenous, Socialist or Islamic values at vari-
ance with liberal-democratic values. 
When dealing with these intrinsic conflicts of objectives, both Germany and the U.S. clearly evalu-
ated the situation according to their particular (liberal-democratic and capitalist) concepts of a 
“good” political order: They have been generally skeptical of Islamic parties in Turkey and feared 
“Islamization” (or “Iranization”), and they have been clearly interested in securing as much as pos-
sible the liberal-democratic character of the evolving political regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador. In 
general, the U.S., in line with its own democratic tradition, tended to emphasize checks and balanc-
es and political counterweights more than Germany. Yet, in the end, neither the U.S. nor Germany 
insisted on their specific models of democracy but were rather flexible and pragmatic in adjusting 
to local conceptions. This was clearly the case when in free and fair elections undisputed majorities 
expressed their support for a given direction of political development, as with the AKP agenda for 
Turkey and the political projects of Morales and Correa in the South American cases. And, as indi-
cated above, relatively good performance in terms of stability, peace and governance led donors to 
downplay democracy-related problems. This, for example, improved donor perceptions of the 
democratic performance of the AKP government in Turkey and Correa in Ecuador, and it certainly 
attenuated critical assessments of Musharraf and Putin. 
Confronted with intrinsic conflicts of objectives, donors generally showed respect for sovereign 
decisions and country ownership. When intrinsic conflicts were perceived as such, typical public 
statements would urge “all parties” to respect the constitutional order while working towards 
strengthening democracy, stability and peace.25 Both the U.S. and Germany did regularly try to 
                                                 
 
24  The exception is Belarus, where neither German nor U.S. democracy promotion was confronted with significant intrin-
sic conflicts of objectives: Both governments perceived the Lukashenko government as indisputably autocratic and an-
ticipated no risks (of destabilization) arising from potential democratization. 
25  When donor statements openly criticized violations of basic democratic standards, they usually assumed that these 
violations were not in any sense helpful for democracy (or stability or governability) but served the narrow interests of 
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shape the domestic processing of such conflicts in various ways. “Technical” advice, capacity build-
ing and the promotion of dialogue as well as diplomatic appeals served as instruments to spread 
donor concepts of democracy and development, to promote a pluralist debate and to strengthen 
“moderate” (democratic, liberal) voices. Yet, once domestic politics in recipient countries in one 
way or another ‘solved’ an intrinsic conflict, donors basically accepted this internal solution – 
whether it complied with donor preferences or not.26 
4.2 Alternatively Conditioned Double Standards in Democracy Promotion 
Having summarized the ways in which the U.S. and Germany dealt with conflicting objectives, we 
now discuss the determinants that have been hypothesized to explain these reactions. This section 
focuses on causal dynamics that hold for both the U.S. and Germany (the differences between the 
two donors will be described and explained in section 5). In this paper, we cannot, however, assess 
in detail the explanatory power of the individual determinants and of their case-specific configura-
tion. Instead, we will synthetically discuss the causal role of three types of determinants (relative 
power position; donor interests; normative dispositions) and focus on one overall phenomenon 
that cuts across these three types and also concerns their interplay: the phenomenon of alternative-
ly conditioned double standards, i.e. of different causal effects depending on specific conditions. 
The relative power position, for instance, unambiguously shapes democracy promotion when small 
(or even negative) power asymmetries give donors the impression of having only little influence on 
the recipient country. Under such premises, donors are reluctant to promote democracy and, as far 
as they do, they largely avoid confrontational strategies. Conversely, however, high power asymme-
tries do not necessarily lead to high assertiveness. The reason is straightforward: success of democ-
racy promotion largely depends on the local conditions, on the balance of power within the coun-
try and to which extent potent entry points and partners for the democracy promoter are available. 
The differentiated causal effect of (high versus low) relative power asymmetries on democracy 
promotion is therefore itself the result of power-related considerations, if from a broader perspec-
tive on power understood as potential influence. 
The formative power of security and/or economic interests is similarly circumscribed. They have a 
direct impact on donor policies when they confirm the status quo and call for cooperation with the 
recipient government. Under these circumstances, donors engage in democracy promotion only 
within the narrow constraints defined by their interests: They do not openly challenge autocratic 
governments, while downplaying democracy-related criticism, ignoring democratic conditionality 
and limiting democracy assistance to cooperative, non-sensitive and long-term activities. Yet inter-
ests have a far less direct impact when they suggest confronting a democratically elected govern-
ment. As seen above, no clear pattern of interest-driven confrontation emerges, if a government 
acts against donor interests but is democratically legitimate. These differences in the relevance of 
donor interests are quite rational: supporting the recipient’s status quo promises yields in line with 
donor interests, attempts to change the status quo are risky and therefore less promising. 
The normative dispositions exist in two types: national conceptions of democracy promotion that 
are supposed to shape the foreign and development policies of a given donor, and international 
democracy norms that are supposed to shape democracy promotion in a given dyad that is part of 
the specific normative environment. In both cases democracy-related norms do not drive donor 
policies in a sense of push or pull, but they constrain the scope of options that are seen as appropri-
ate or justifiable. This constraining effect again plays out in a differentiated manner: It is clearly 
observable when a purely interest-based policy would call for an active violation of democratic 
norms (e.g., for confronting an elected government); but the constraining effect disappears once 
interests call for omitting a normatively appropriate behavior (e.g., for not confronting an autocratic 
                                                                                                                                     
 
the incumbent government only. Examples include electoral fraud and post-electoral violence in Belarus or the re-
strictions imposed on NGOs in Russia.  
26  The forms of such ‘acceptance’ ranged from toleration – in the sense of not adopting any active countermeasures – all 
the way to direct support. 
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government). This differentiated effect can be explained by the basic distinction that active viola-
tion of a norm is qualitatively different from passive neglect. In addition it finds support in the 
effects of traditional international norms (sovereignty, non-intervention): they support democracy-
related norms in the case of preventing norm violation (against a democratic government), but 
work against them in the case of promoting norm compliance (against an autocratic government). 
It becomes clear that the well-known diagnosis of double standards in Western politics is too sim-
ple both empirically and theoretically. Instead one can observe what we call alternatively condi-
tioned double standards. Donor interests do not consistently override democracy norms, and donor 
behavior cannot be explained by ranking interests as primary and norms as secondary. To summa-
rize our findings in a very broad pattern: Vis-à-vis a democratic government that threatens donor 
interests, the normative prohibition to openly fight it shapes donor policies in spite of the interest to 
change the status quo, which is, even under conditions of high power asymmetries, difficult and 
risky to pursue. Vis-à-vis a non-democratic government that serves donor interests, the interest to 
uphold the status quo consistently overrides the normative inclination that democracy promoters 
should work towards regime change. As a result, the specific conditions in the recipient country, by 
constraining what is normatively appropriate and pragmatically possible, lead to double standards 
with a view to both interests and norms: An interest in upholding the status quo is causally more 
relevant than an equally strong interest in changing it; the constraining effect of one and the same 
norm is stronger in prohibiting its violation than in producing compliance. The same differentiated 
effect can also be observed in power relations between donor and recipient. 
5. The National Patterns of Democracy Promotion 
5.1 “Freedom Fighter” Versus “Civilian Power”? 
The U.S. and Germany were selected as donors, inter alia, because existing research led us to suppose 
that the two would represent different approaches to democracy promotion. In order to heuristically 
grasp these differences, two ideal-type conceptions of democracy promotion were construed: the 
“Civilian Power” and the “Freedom Fighter”. A qualitative content analysis of German and U.S. gov-
ernment sources demonstrated that the official rhetoric of the two governments generally corre-
sponded to these ideal types. The case studies confirm this distinction between the German “Civilian 
Power” and the U.S. “Freedom Fighter” but also led us to introduce crucial qualifications. 
German policies correspond to the Civilian Power-type conception of democracy promotion. 
German governments proved reluctant to meddle in recipient countries’ affairs and tolerant of 
deviance from German notions of liberal democracy and the rule of law. Germany favors strategies 
of engagement and bonding, and is reluctant to confront the powers that be – the only exception 
being Belarus. Similarly, non-provocative and non-confrontational strategies predominate in the 
German democracy assistance portfolio: While the government’s official democracy aid is focused 
on the public sector, governance-related issues and cooperation with the state, the parastatal 
Stiftungen emphasize an all-encompassing dialogue, gradual change and long-term capacity build-
ing. Overall, Germany’s rhetoric on democracy promotion demonstrates a basic openness: It is 
characterized by vagueness in terms, restraint in political demands, and avoidance of dichotomous 
or teleological thinking – all reminiscent of the Civilian Power. These general features characteriz-
ing German democracy promotion are not affected by changes in government.27 
U.S. policies, in contrast, meet the characteristics of the Freedom Fighter only to a limited extent. 
U.S. rhetoric generally proves much more explicit in terms of emphasizing normative standards and 
criticizing what it perceives as violation of such standards. The U.S. is also more willing to respond 
to open violations of democratic rule with (the threat of) sanctions. In the case of Belarus, the only 
recipient country officially labeled a dictatorship, Manichean rhetoric and a strategy of exclusion 
                                                 
 
27  During the period under study, the governing coalitions in Germany changed from ‘red-green’ (SPD and the Green 
Party) via a Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD) to a center-right government (CDU/CSU and FDP). 
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were even more readily employed than by Germany. U.S. democracy assistance, like German offi-
cial aid, applies cooperative, government-oriented and long-term strategies but it also includes 
support for – and empowerment of – opposition (civil-society) groups. And in some instances the 
U.S. even tried to directly influence the outcome of internal democratic processes. Yet the major 
difference between Germany and the U.S consists of the observation that U.S. democracy promo-
tion draws on both Freedom Fighter-type and Civilian Power-type activities, while Germany con-
fines itself to the latter. Again, changes in the donor government do not significantly affect these 
patterns of U.S. democracy promotion. In terms of overall rhetoric, the Bush Administration was 
certainly more explicit and assertive than the Obama Administration, but across our recipient cases 
this was not followed by significant changes in democracy promotion policies. 
A brief look at the dimensions of democracy promotion as identified in Table 1 may illustrate the 
differences in the German and U.S. patterns. 
International observation, primarily electoral observation: Although Germany contributed in all 
our cases to multilateral observation missions (EU, OSCE, Council of Europe), neither in German 
foreign policy nor in German democracy assistance did elections play a major role. Either Germany 
just acted on the assumption that generally free and fair elections were being held (Bolivia, Ecua-
dor, Turkey), or Berlin preferred to not explicitly meddle with this contentious topic and basically 
accepted elections even if they were deemed as undemocratic (Pakistan, Russia). The exception was 
Belarus where the German government continuously expressed specific demands before elections 
and took explicit stances afterwards. 
For the U.S., elections and electoral observation proved a much more important topic. This not 
only concerns bilateral or multilateral observation missions but also the use of tools that go beyond 
mere observation, namely diplomatic statements on elections and democracy assistance (capacity 
building) that supports local electoral observation by both state agencies and civil-society groups. 
In some cases, U.S. diplomatic statements and/or U.S. foreign assistance actively intervened in elec-
toral processes – in favor of or against a particular candidate. This could be observed in Bolivia’s 
2002 elections (against the presidential candidate Evo Morales) and in the run-up to Pakistan’s 2008 
elections (in favor of a deal between President Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto). 
Foreign Aid: In terms of democracy assistance, the portfolios differ less between the U.S. and Ger-
many than between different types of recipient countries. In the case of democratic developing 
countries like Bolivia and Ecuador, democracy assistance is the main part of explicitly democracy-
related activities. Even if democracy promotion was never the most important part of either U.S. or 
German development cooperation in these countries, the latter included programs aimed at build-
ing institutional capacities and/or strengthening particular actors (political parties, advocacy 
groups etc.) and entailed cooperation with both state and non-state partners. On the other side of 
the spectrum, democracy assistance in relatively rich countries (Russia, Turkey) is largely limited to 
parastatal organizations like Germany’s Stiftungen and their U.S. counterparts. The same holds true 
for Pakistan, poor and non-democratic, but allied during Musharraf ’s rule after 9/11: Besides 
parastatal activities, German official development cooperation was rather “apolitical” while, in the 
U.S. case, some democracy assistance (focused on elections and the legislature) was by far out-
weighed by actual autocracy assistance, i.e., budget support for the Musharraf regime. 
Across our cases, democracy assistance with a clear partisan profile was the exception, only to be 
observed in the case of U.S. policy towards Belarus. German democracy assistance to Belarus 
equally emphasized civil society aid and terminated any government-related support early on, but 
in spite of the confrontational official stance towards the Lukashenko regime did not depart from 
the preference for broad-based dialogue. A bias towards supporting the opposition (or, at least, 
counterweights) to the Morales government could also be observed in U.S. foreign assistance to 
Bolivia, but the U.S. also tried to remain engaged with the government showing some flexibility to 
adjust to official Bolivian demands. 
Diplomacy: Democracy and related issues like human rights, the rule of law and good governance 
are regular topics of bilateral dialogues between donor and recipient governments across our cases. 
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With a view to public official statements that contain democracy-related appeals, however, there is 
a notable difference between the German and the U.S. government. 
Washington rather consistently refers to political developments and events in recipient countries, 
regularly assesses the state of democracy and human rights (like the State Department’s Human 
Rights Reports) and articulates specific democracy demands. When looking at the spectrum of U.S. 
diplomatic statements across the recipient countries, there are however some striking inconsistencies. 
In the case of Turkey, traditional U.S. relations with the Kemalist elite and skepticism towards pro-
Islamic parties led U.S. administrations to react remarkably neutral even in cases of clearly undemo-
cratic moves (attempts to blackmail elected governments or ban “unwanted” political parties). Re-
sponding to Musharraf ’s takeover in Pakistan, the Clinton administration publicly condemned the 
coup; but later – and, in particular, after 9/11 – U.S. official rhetoric became increasingly cautious and, 
in fact, pro-Musharraf and returned to “pro-democratic” statements only in the context of escalating 
domestic protests against Musharraf. With regard to Putin’s Russia, an important shift in the official 
rhetoric was identified: starting with quite favorable statements about Putin’s vision for a democratic 
and free country during the first George W. Bush administration to a much more critical stance in the 
second and back again under the auspices of the “reset” between Obama and Medvedev. As a rule 
official U.S. attention to democracy “problems” is rather low once bilateral relations improve (e.g., in 
the dyads USA/Pakistan and USA/Russia following 9/11) or when U.S. interest in improving relations 
increases (e.g., in the dyads USA/Bolivia and USA/Ecuador during the second Bush administration 
or, across the recipient countries, during the Obama administration). 
Berlin, in contrast, only occasionally issues public statements about the state of democracy and 
human rights in the recipient countries. Responding to electoral fraud in Belarus, it was the Bun-
destag in the first place to demand from the German government pushing Lukashenko towards 
compliance with his commitments in terms of democratic elections. And the government issued 
increasingly strong statements to that effect, most notably during the conservative-liberal coalition 
(since 2009). With a view to Turkey, the German government kept silent to the “soft coup” against 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in 1997 but, in the 2000s, publicly supported both the govern-
ment of Erdoğan and his AKP against domestic threats. Vis-à-vis Russia, frequent statements by the 
German government expressing concern about the chaotic democratic transition during the 1990s 
gave way to increasing silence on (and attempts to circumscribe) Russia’s democratic shortcomings. 
Public criticism as to Russian democracy mainly came from respective opposition parties (no mat-
ter political colors). Responding to Musharraf ’s coup in 1999 and to Musharraf ’s imposition of 
emergency rule in late 2007, the German government demanded a return to constitutional order, 
but for most of the time in-between it remained silent. Only after Musharraf had already resigned, 
the German government – in its intergovernmental negotiations with Pakistan – emphasized the 
need to advance with democratization. 
Conditioning international cooperation: Officially, both Germany and the U.S. condition their coop-
eration with recipient countries on democracy standards. Indeed, the U.S. reacted swiftly by impos-
ing (or tightening or threatening) sanctions in cases of an open breach with the democratic order 
(Belarus 1996, Pakistan 1998, Ecuador 2000) or in cases of electoral fraud followed by political 
repression (Belarus 2006, 2010). But when the toppling of an elected government was seen as serv-
ing U.S. “national interests”, was driven by U.S. allies and took the shape of a “soft” coup (Turkey 
1997), democratic conditions were not enforced. The same applies to Russia where, given a signifi-
cant U.S. interest in maintaining cooperation with the Russian government, an increasingly critical 
perception did not provoke any punitive measures as demanded by the U.S. congress. When over-
whelming “national interests” called for cooperation with a coup government, as with Musharraf 
after 9/11, the U.S. quickly suspended its sanctions without requiring any democracy-related con-
cessions. At the same time, U.S. threats of sanctions against Bolivia in 2002 and Bolivia’s exclusion 
from trade preferences in 2008 were driven not by democracy-related considerations but responded 
to (worries about) the country’s denial to cooperate with the U.S., particularly in the area of 
counternarcotics. Yet Bolivia’s suspension from the U.S. MCA was at least justified (if not driven) 
by a gradual decline in governance indicators. 
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Germany, as a rule, is much more reluctant to impose democracy-related sanctions. In fact, Belarus 
is the only case in our sample where Germany applied this “negative” form of democracy promo-
tion. And even here, it is not German sanctions proper but a common policy of the EU with its 
different drivers. Within the EU, Germany was relatively reluctant to impose sanctions and, most of 
the time, argued in favor of an approach that tried to engage Lukashenko (exceptions being Ger-
man reactions to the 1996 referendum and to the 2010 post-electoral repression). In the German 
relationship with Turkey, the EU accession process establishes a framework of explicit and far-
reaching political conditions. Yet, while generally supportive of EU conditionality, the German 
government (driven by the conservative parties CDU/CSU) has fundamentally threatened this 
approach by signaling a categorical rejection of Turkey’s EU membership, irrespective of compli-
ance with the EU acquis communautaire. Vis-à-vis Pakistan, Germany had already suspended its 
development cooperation in response to the 1998 nuclear test when Musharraf took power, and it 
gradually resumed development aid only two years later without posing any democratic conditions. 
Military intervention: In our cases the use of direct (physical) violence only showed up in a few 
instances and always in cooperation with (or at least tolerated by) respective recipient governments. 
This basically concerns military and paramilitary U.S. activities in Pakistan (related to the “War on 
Terror”) and in Bolivia and Ecuador (related to the “War on Drugs”). These U.S. measures are 
clearly not driven by the aim to promote democracy in respective countries, but they do have de-
mocracy-related implications: directly, as they imply military support to the political regime in 
place, whether democratic or not; indirectly, because U.S. (para-) military activities can either con-
tribute to escalating violent conflict or to bringing about peace and stability which is obviously 
important for the future of democracy in respective countries. 
5.2 How Are These Differences To Be Explained? 
As we have outlined above, the national patterns of democracy promotion clearly differ between 
the U.S. and Germany. This by and large confirms previous findings (Schraeder 2003: 33-38; 
Spanger and Wolff 2007: 280-4). However, as seen, the difference does not develop along the lines 
of our ideal types according to which the U.S. would behave like a Freedom Fighter and Germany 
like a Civilian Power. Rather U.S. democracy promotion draws on both Freedom Fighter-type and 
Civilian Power-type activities, while Germany sticks to the latter. 
The close correspondence between German policies and the Civilian Power conception of democ-
racy promotion can be explained by a coherent configuration of normative disposition, donor in-
terests and specific requirements of the institutional setup of German democracy assistance. The 
Civilian Power’s logic of appropriateness corresponds closely to the overall profile of German donor 
interests, by and large in line with the “trading state” (Rosecrance 1986). It furthermore corre-
sponds to the heterogeneity of partisan actors engaged in German democracy assistance which can 
best be accommodated by a democracy promotion strategy that is broad, oriented at dialogue and 
not too streamlined politically. And it is in line with Germany’s own history which clearly defies 
posturing as a democracy lecturer. The U.S., by contrast, does have the option to apply a Freedom 
Fighter strategy because the U.S. conception of democracy promotion does provide for an active 
and assertive approach and because the political heterogeneity of the democracy assistance agencies 
is much less pronounced and their embeddedness in an overall foreign-policy frame is higher.28 Yet, 
U.S. policies regularly deviate from the Freedom Fighter type because U.S. interests quite often 
point into the opposite direction. In addition, our case studies suggest that the normative and con-
ceptual premises of the Civilian Power fit much better the complex challenges posed by countries in 
which the dilemmas inherent to democratization come to the fore (see 2.). Successfully applying 
the linear and dichotomous conception of the Freedom Fighter, by contrast, requires rather specific 
conditions in the recipient country. 
                                                 
 
28  This is, of course, a comparative statement: in terms of political orientation, NDI and IRI are much more similar than 
Germany’s political foundations; and USAID is much more politically in line with the State Department than GTZ and 
BMZ are with the German Foreign Office. 
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While German policies correspond to the conception of democracy promotion we label Civilian 
Power, it is important to note that both our theoretical concept and German practice deviate from 
the concept as developed by Hanns Maull and colleagues. In the literature on Germany as a Civilian 
Power, these authors conceive the promotion of “good governance” and “processes of democratiza-
tion” (Kirste and Maull 1996: 302), or of “democracy and human rights” (Maull 2001: 125), as con-
stituent parts of a Civilian Power, but this claim remains underspecified. On closer look, the general 
Civilian Power preference for democracy and human rights translates into a concrete commitment 
to democracy promotion only with significant modifications. Civilian Powers – according to the 
general normative expectation formulated by Maull et al. – are skeptical about the unilateral export 
of models, are characterized by a “culture of restraint”, and rely on international norms and on the 
“civilizing” of world politics through cooperative integration. This has repercussions for promoting 
democracy as it rules out to openly reject the sovereignty claims of other states in the name of de-
mocracy, impose democratic conditions and block the cooperative integration of autocracies 
(Poppe et al. forthcoming). Consequently, the German practice of democracy promotion proves 
much more nuanced and even ambiguous than the undifferentiated conclusion that Germany, as a 
Civilian Power, should be expected to give a central value to democracy and human rights would 
lead us to expect.  
The heterogeneity of actors involved in promoting democracy has led Peter Burnell to caution 
against the attempt to identify and explain national patterns of democracy promotion: “the number 
and range of dramatis personae […], the diversity of organizational forms, approaches and principal 
concerns” does render it difficult “to depict the real agenda behind international democracy pro-
motion“ and makes the idea that there could be a “valid and comprehensive general theory“ of 
external democracy promotion questionable (Burnell 2000: 34). Our case studies certainly confirm 
the diversity, but in the comparative analysis we could identify overall patterns that characterize 
German and U.S. democracy promotion as well as general factors that shape these patterns. The 
quasi-governmental organizations like the German political foundations or the U.S. party institutes 
are part of these national patterns. Their raison d’être within the overall division of labor, in fact, 
makes them an important instrument of foreign policy. In the U.S. case, NDI and IRI, for example, 
assume the task of strengthening specific political forces – something USAID or the U.S. Embassy 
cannot do. In the German case, the political pluralism of the Stiftungen together with their focus on 
dialogue and long-term evolution perfectly fits the Civilian Power approach to democracy promo-
tion. And their affiliation with political parties, not governments, ensures that elections and chang-
es in the composition of donor governments do not significantly affect these national patterns of 
democracy promotion.  
6. Conclusion 
The comparative analysis presented here indicates that democracy promotion can neither be un-
derstood as simply norm-guided nor as purely interest-driven. As the notion of alternatively condi-
tioned double standards highlights, we observe reflexive policies of democracy promotion – reflex-
ive in the sense that democracy promotion policies reflect interests that drive policies, normative 
dispositions and power relations that constrain and enable, as well as specific conditions in the 
recipient country which define the normatively appropriate and the pragmatically possible. When 
appreciating this reflexivity, we can account for the fact that donor policies across our cases are 
regularly either too cooperative or too democracy-oriented when seen from a rationalist perspec-
tive, and either too confrontational or too cautious when seen from an idealist view. For instance, 
in U.S. policies towards Bolivia, Ecuador and Turkey, “national interests” would have suggested 
much less cooperation with the incumbent governments, while U.S. respect for democratic self-
determination has been more ambiguous than normatively appropriate. German policies towards 
Turkey and Russia as well as U.S. policies towards Russia have been more democracy-oriented than 
purely rationalist interest calculation would appreciate, but much too cautious in terms of an ideal-
istic perspective on democracy norms. The notion of alternatively conditioned double standards, 
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by grasping the differentiated impact of and the interplay between interests, norms and context 
conditions, helps understand these complex realities of democracy promotion: the particularly 
ambiguous U.S. policies towards Bolivia, Ecuador and Turkey; the unusually consistent pattern of 
democracy promotion in the cases U.S./Belarus, Germany/Belarus, Germany/Bolivia and Germa-
ny/Ecuador); the low-profile of democracy promotion in the dyads U.S./Russia, Germany/Russia 
and Germany/Turkey; and the virtual non-existence of any democracy promotion in U.S. and 
German policies towards Pakistan. 
At the present stage, we could only outline the broad dynamics of such reflexive policies of democ-
racy promotion. More theoretical and empirical work is needed to conceptualize and study the 
articulation of interests and norms and domestic and international power relations in the interna-
tional politics of democracy promotion. As a first step in this direction, the two ideal-type concep-
tions presented in this paper (Freedom Fighter and Civilian Power) proved useful not only as heu-
ristic devices to grasp different normative dispositions vis-à-vis democracy promotion, but also 
helpful in identifying the interplay between norms, interests and context conditions: the close and 
harmonious interrelation between the Civilian Power’s normative disposition, dominant “national 
interests”, institutional characteristics of the donor and prevalent conditions in the recipient coun-
tries in the case of Germany; and the frequent clash between norms attributed to the Freedom 
Fighter, “national interests” and unsuitable conditions in the recipient countries in the U.S. case. 
While we observe democracy promotion to be de facto reflexive in the ways outlined above, there is 
no evidence that donors consciously reflect on this problematique: in none of our cases did we find 
attempts by the donors to deliberate the complex interplay of aims and conditions in any organized 
pattern. A general practical implication of the study is, in this sense, the need for democracy pro-
moters to systematically include the problem of extrinsic and intrinsic conflicting objectives into 
their strategies. This includes the necessity of consciously reflecting on the conceptual and material 
underpinnings as well as on the ambivalences and limits of international democracy promotion. 
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